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Politicians’ ability to survive a scandal is more to do with their
ability to govern and maintain coalition than with the public’s
approval.
Last week we saw New Jersey Governor Chris Christie embroiled in what has become known as
the ‘Bridgegate’ scandal. But what are the factors that make a scandal last longer or shorten
them? Brandon Rottinghaus has made an in-depth study of national and state-level scandals,
finding that at state level they generally last for less than 100 days, and around six months for
presidential-level scandals. He finds that elected officials are far more likely to survive scandals
as opposed to appointees, because, having been elected; they are simply harder to remove, and
that a greater degree of legislative opposition makes scandals harder to overcome.
The recent and ongoing scandals involving Toronto Mayor Rob Ford (allegations of drug use), New Jersey
Governor Chris Christie (aides closing part of a bridge), Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell and his family (possibly
illegal acceptance of gifts) and President Barack Obama (Benghazi or the IRS scandal) has the media querying
how politicians survive these seemingly career-ending episodes.  Of course, these events are only a few on a
long list of past and current scandals affecting politicians at all levels.
It is clear that scandals are a common part of political life
for most chief executives, but which factors shorten or
lengthen the duration of a scandal?  The emergence of
scandals presents strategic choices for elected officials
and staff to resign or not and political choices for
legislators to sanction or impeach an elected executive. 
These strategic decisions relate to the political
environment, most prominently political strength.  For
instance, one factor often referenced in the survival of a
scandal is the amount of political support for a politician in
the legislature, where greater numbers of willing
defenders within the politician’s political party provide for
pillars of support.  The state of the economy is also often
pointed to as a factor in surviving scandal.  For instance,
President Clinton was suggested to have survived the
Monica Lewinsky scandal, and subsequent impeachment,
because he presided over a robust economy.  Public
approval may also play a role where greater political
strength for an executive flows from higher poll numbers. 
Of course, the “entertainment” value of a scandal, often
directly related to salacious charges of infidelity or
personal indiscretions, often factor into a quick end for politicians embroiled in scandal.
In recent research, I argue that various institutional and political factors affect the likelihood of political survival for
politicians accused of wrongdoing.  Using data tracking U.S. executive scandals (governors and presidents) from
1972 to 2011, I chart the duration of each scandal and examine the factors that end an official’s career more
quickly (through resignation or termination).
Figure 1 – Frequency and duration of state scandals
In general, scandals tend to be short lived events.  Figures 1 and 2 depict histogram for state and national
executive scandals.  For state scandals, the average length of a scandal (excluding one outlier) is 255 days.  Most
state level scandals last for less than 100 days, with only a few lasting longer.  For instance, Governor James
McGreevey of New Jersey admitted that he was a homosexual and had an affair with another man in his
administration the same day he announced he planned to step down as governor.  Scandals do not always end
badly for governors, even if they are short.  In another example, Governor Bill Sheffield of Alaska, who was
accused of misusing his office and lying under oath, was spared from impeachment after just 11 days of hearings
after the Senate decided that there was not enough credible evidence to impeach him.
Figure 2 – Frequency and duration of presidential scandals
The data on presidential scandals, also demonstrate that most national chief executive scandals end quickly
(although not as quickly as most state-level scandals).  In fact, nineteen scandals required less than one month
from start to finish.  Like gubernatorial scandals, most of the cases are over within 100 days.  Only about 30 of the
national level scandals last less than 100 days.  Often, these fast-concluding scandals involve nominees, such as
Bernard Kerik (Secretary of Homeland Security nominee), Douglas Ginsburg (Supreme Court nominee) and three
“Nannygate” nominees (Kimba Wood, Zoe Baird, and Linda Chavez). Among office holders, Eli Segal, the first
CEO of Americorps, resigned abruptly when it was alleged that he had conducted improper business
relationships.  Peter Bourne, President Carter’s “drug czar,” resigned when he was caught writing a prescription
for a fictitious individual (under the guise of giving the prescription to a White House colleague).  Ultimately, the
median scandal lasts six months.  The average scandal is longer than state level scandals at 636 days.
So, which factors predict a quicker end to scandals?  First, the findings reveal that elected officials themselves (as
opposed to appointees, nominees or staff) are more likely to survive a scandal.  Considering complicated
mechanisms for removal from power, and considering a general reluctance to take these extreme actions anyway,
this leads to inertia for high ranking elected officials surviving their scandals.  These politicians are also less likely
to resign, believing the voters mandated their time in office.  This explains, in part, why Toronto Mayor Rob Ford
has survived in office during his recent erratic behavior.
Second, public approval of a politician has no effect on protecting executives from the damage of scandal.  We
might expect worsening public approval to have a deleterious effect on political survival.  Although Virginia
Governor Bob McDonnell’s approval ratings were quite low at the time he left office, approval appears to have no
effect.  Many such politicians discount current opinion and cling to the original public electoral voice that elected
them.
Third, although personal scandals (as opposed to financial scandals) sink careers of those associated with
national executives, there is less of a consistent effect at the state level.
However, my strongest institutional findings also suggest that the presence of more legislative opposition leads to
less chance of surviving scandal.  The prospect of further legislative losses in the New Jersey legislature likely
prompted the termination of Governor Christie’s Deputy Chief of Staff in “Bridgegate,” where several of the
Governor’s aides engaged in closing a bridge during peak travel times ostensibly for political retribution.
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The survival of scandal has
serious implications for
governance at the state and
national level.  Ultimately, the
ability to survive scandal, then, is
connected to the executive’s
ability to govern and maintain a
viable political coalition rather
than the amount of adulation
received by the public, affirming
the partisan institutional
importance of governing in crisis.
This article is based on the
paper, “Surviving Scandal: The
Institutional and Political
Dynamics of National and State
Executive Scandals” in the
January 2014 issue of PS:
Political Science and Politics.
Please read our comments policy before commenting. 
Note:  This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of USApp– American Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics. 
Shortened URL for this post: http://bit.ly/1cSlu88
_________________________
About the author
Brandon Rottinghaus – University of Houston
Brandon Rottinghaus is the Senator Don Henderson Scholar at the Department of Political
Science, at the University of Houston.  He holds a Ph.D. in political science from Northwestern
University.  His primary research and teaching interests include the presidency, the American
governor, the media, public opinion, executive-legislative relations and research methods.  His
work on these subjects has appeared in several journals, edited volumes and law review articles
and in his book, The Provisional Pulpit:  Modern Conditional Presidential Leadership of Public
Opinion (Texas A&M University Press).  He is also the founding designer of the Presidential
Proclamations Project at the University of Houston, an online resource documenting presidential use of unilateral
powers through executive proclamation.
CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 2014 LSE USAPP
